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INTELLIGENCE DESIGN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEC's NEW
OFFICE OF MARKET INTELLIGENCE AND ITS GOAL OF USING
BIG DATA TO IMPROVE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT
Geoffrey ChristopherRapp*
I. INTRODUCTION

On January 13, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) announced an internal reorganization. Among the changes was
the creation of a new Office of Market Intelligence (OMI or Office)
within the Division of Enforcement. To a large degree, OMI's creation
addressed the persistent and troubling failures on the part of the SEC to
process and respond to numerous tips concerning the massive Ponzi
scheme perpetrated by Bernard Madoff.' Analyzing the SEC's failings
in the Madoff case, Donald Langevoort argued in 2009 that "the SEC
needs to turn itself into a 'Financial Intelligence Agency' that uses more
effective 'on the ground' surveillance tools to understand and monitor
emerging risks to investors in the financial markets and securities
industry." 2 While the SEC did not entirely shift its approach, OMI
represents its answer to Professor Langevoort's challenge.
This Article describes the motivation for the formation of the new
Office, the SEC's understanding of OMI's mission, the Office's initial
structure and evolution, and offers a prognosis for its future. The Article
explores how the Office aligns with two templates-"market
intelligence" as a business tool and the more traditional intelligence
functions pursued by the federal government: its national defense,
* Harold A. Anderson Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law. I
would like to thank Professor Black and the University of Cincinnati for the opportunity to participate in
a wonderful symposium and contribute this work to the published Law Review volume.
1. The SEC's internal report faulted the agency for failing to take action in spite of "credible
and specific allegations regarding Madoffs financial wrongdoing" which were "repeatedly brought to
the attention

of SEC

staff."
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SECURITIES

AND

EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF

INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S
PONzI SCHEME-PUBLIC VERSION-CASE
No. OIG-509, at 1 (2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf [hereinafter MADOFF OIG]. The Inspector General's
report "ultimately helped shape the nature and scope" of post-Madoff reforms "by taking a critical eye
to the factors that contributed to the SEC's failure." Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Adaptation
and Resiliency in Legal Systems, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1629, 1663 (2011).
2. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of a
Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 910 (2009). Joining Professor Langevoort in this call for change
was Professor Jill Fisch, who argued that the SEC "must become more proactive in identifying trends,
evaluating existing regulation and understanding new financial markets and products." Jill E. Fisch,
Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 820 (2009). Professor Fisch called for
greater use of nonlawyer consultants, "including Wall Street traders, economists, and buy-side
investors." Id She argued the SEC should "collect more extensive data," and hire "empirical scholars
to evaluate this data." Id. at 820-21.
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security, and increasingly, law enforcement roles.
In particular, OMI challenges two aspects of the broader federal
experience with intelligence. First, the key conceptual framework for
most intelligence activities involves a "cycle," with intelligence tools
being deployed according to prioritized needs and intelligence results or
products feeding back in to the identification of new intelligence
missions. At first glance, at least, OMI appears to be driven more by
capabilities than by requirements, and it is unclear whether the SEC has
fully embraced a cyclical approach to its nascent intelligence function.
Second, particularly as America has turned its attention to combatting
violent extremism abroad, most federal intelligence activities have
pursued a unification of intelligence functions with operational
functions; arguably, by carving out intelligence separately within its
operational/enforcement apparatus, the SEC has bucked this trend.3
Will the new OMI make a difference? The null hypothesis, which
must be our starting point in reflecting upon any internal structural
change pursued by an agency in response to perceived failings in the
past, is that the new structure will make no difference in the agency's
performance in the future.
Consider, for instance, the regular reorganization of national defense
intelligence activities. After failing to predict the collapse of the Soviet
bloc 4 or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s,5 America
reorganized its intelligence community (IC), creating joint intelligence
centers,6 unifying different military intelligence units, and the like. But
the IC missed 9/11. 7 Post-9/11, there were again major shifts in
intelligence administration, including the creation of a new Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) position8 and the augmentation of a
National Counterterrorism Center9 , but the IC failed to predict the so3. On the other hand, it might be argued that OMI does not represent a carve-out of intelligence,
but the creation, for the first time, of an intelligence function.
4. Uri Friedman, The Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures, FOREIGN POLIcY, Dec. 1,
2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/1/3/the-ten biggest-american-intelligencefailures?page=
0,6.
5. Franklin Foer & Spencer Ackerman, The Radical: What Dick Cheney Really Believes, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 20, 2003, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/the-radical (stating that "[w]hen
Saddam first began amassing troops on the Kuwaiti border in mid-1990, conventional wisdom in the
U.S. intelligence community held that he was attempting to gain leverage in OPEC talks and, at the
most, might seize a Kuwaiti oil field").
6. David L. Boren, The Winds of Change at the CIA, 101 YALE L.J. 853,859(1992).
7. Friedman, supra note 4.
8. The DNI was created "to lead the intelligence community and to serve as the President's
primary intelligence advisor for national security, functions previously performed by the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)." Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence:
Structuringand OverseeingAgencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2006).
9. McKay M. Smith, The Nuclear Terrorism Readiness and Alert Center: Transforming the
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called "Arab Spring" of 201 1.o
The failure of the intelligence community's reorganization rounds to
produce different outcomes is by no means unique. Perhaps two thirds
of organizational change efforts fail to achieve their goals." Any
reorganization spurred by "a panicked desire to quickly offset negative
public reaction" will face an uphill battle when it comes to producing
real-world benefits.12
II. ORIGINS OF THE OMI
Like most' 3 great origin stories,14 OMI's roots are found in a "sad and
important story."' 5 In spite of numerous, high-quality tips, the SEC
failed to act in a timely fashion to address the Madoff financial fraud.
The Commission's jarring lack of a response, in spite of receiving highquality tips from Harry Markopolos and others, stimulated both internal
soul-searching and external criticism. As one author put it, "The SEC's
investigation of Madoff was a failure of colossal proportions."l 6
Although the SEC's 2009 Inspector General Report on the
Commission's role in the Madoff scandal is "more recitation than
analysis,"' 7 from it one can identify two critical failures on the part of
the agency-the first was cultural in nature, the second process-

oriented. OMI represents an attempt to break both traditions to align the
SEC of the future for more effective and timely intervention.

Aspirational Nature of InternationalLaw into Operational Capabilities,40 CAP. U. L. REV. 701, 714
(2012).
10. Abe Shulsky & Gary Schmitt, Weekly Standard: Another Intelligence Failure?,NAT'L PUB.
RADIO,
Feb.
22,
2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/22/133956664/weekly-standard-anotherintelligence-failure.
11. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing and Reforming the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Lessonsfrom Literatureon Change Leadership, 55 VILL. L. REV. 627, 628-29 (2010).
12. Id. at 628.
13. Robin Rosenberg, The Psychology Behind Superhero Origin Stories: How does Following
the Adventures of Spider-Man and Batman Inspire Us to Cope with Adversity?, SMITHSONIAN, Feb.
2013, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/The-Psychology-Behind-Superhero-Origin-Stories187938991.html (stating that "[a]t their best, superhero origin stories inspire us and provide models of
coping with adversity, finding meaning in loss and trauma, discovering our strengths and using them for
good purpose").
14. Superman, of course, has his origins in the destruction of a planet, see TOM DE HAVEN, OUR
HERO: SUPERMAN ON EARTH 205 (2010); Spider-Man in Peter Parker's failure to avert the death of his
Uncle Ben, see Taneli Kukkonen, What Price Atonement? Peter Parker and the Infinite Debt, in
SPIDER-MAN AND PHILOSOPHY: THE WEB OF INQUIRY 22, 22-23 (2010).
15.

Langevoort, supra note 2, at 914.

16. Cheryl Nichols, Addressing Inept SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessonsfrom Madoff the Hedge
FundIndustry, and Title IV of the Dodd-FrankAct for U.S. and Global Financial Systems, 31 Nw. J.
INT'L & BUS. 637, 661 (2011).
17. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 901.
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A. CulturalFailingsat the SEC
The SEC has a terrible track record in regards to its attitude toward
whistleblowers and tipsters. Whistleblowers, of course, are a thorny
bunch. They are, as Fred Alford, a Maryland sociologist, has observed,
generally not the kind of people with whom you want to have a beer.' 8
Understandably but unforgivably, the SEC has repeatedly shown disdain
if not outright hostility when confronted with tips about fraudulent
schemes within its regulatory purview when those tips come from
individuals rather than highly respected Self-Regulatory Organizations.
Just as corporations have individual cultures which influence the actions
of their agents,19 so to do administrative agencies. In the SEC's case, its
traditional culture has proved an impediment to receiving and
processing information from outside sources.
In the Madoff scandal, the SEC simply did not take whistleblower
allegations seriously. The IG's Report indicates that SEC personnel, in
a variety of offices and over a period of years, thought that a complaint
from someone other than a Madoff client simply was not worth
Staff members "quickly made the judgment that
pursuing.
[whistleblower Harry Markopolos] was obnoxious and self-absorbed,
deep into his own personal crusade against Bernie Madoff," which led to
less "attention" being paid "to the underlying argument" the
whistleblower had advanced.20 Cultural roadblocks meant that the SEC
staff failed to discern how truly different the complaints raised by
Madoff Whistleblowers were from other tips that the Commission
received.
The Madoff scandal is not the only instance in which the SEC has
demonstrated a poor culture for responding to whistleblowers. For the
decade between the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and the roll-out of rules
under Dodd-Frank, the first federal avenue for whistleblower
complaints was the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). Even though dozens, if not hundreds of tips regarding
financial fraud were being generated by Sarbanes--Oxley (SOX)
discrimination complaints, the SEC abdicated responsibility for followup investigation. Its officials indicated that they wanted to leave the
issue of whistleblower complaints to OSHA. 2 1 In another particularly
egregious example, an SEC attorney apparently provided a
18. Laurie Abraham, Anatomy of a Whistleblower, MOTHER JONES, Jan. 1, 2004,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/01/anatomy-whistleblower.
19. Gregory Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 9
(2012).
20. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 909.
21. Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L.
REv. 1, 51 (2012).
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whistleblower's identit' to counsel for the company for which the
whistleblower worked.2
Clearly, the SEC's cultural failings have led the agency to miss
multiple opportunities to leverage an increase in information about
financial fraud into more effective regulatory oversight.
B. Process-OrientedFailings

The second set of failings on the part of the SEC regarding the
Madoff scandal had to do with bad process. There was a tremendous
lack of coordination in the SEC's responsiveness and follow-up to
Madoff-related tips. Two different SEC offices were investigating
Madoff at one point, and learned of their parallel inquiries from the
subject of the investigation.2 3 The SEC's processes failed to recognize

that repeat complaints involving the same essential entities and accused
wrongdoers were a sign of something worthy of a follow-up. Responses
to tips were delayed, at times without explanation.24
SEC personnel assumed resources would not be available to conduct
follow-up investigations, without conducting even basic triage of tips
and complaints to decide which ones could be investigated at a
reasonable or feasible cost. They also narrowly confined the scope of
their inquiry of Madoff to align with the specialty of the investigators
(looking only at the possibility of front-running).2 5 SEC Regional
Office investigators gave no consideration to joining forces with
examiners from other offices, in spite of their suspicions regarding
"Madoff's performance and returns." 26
C. Yet Another Piece ofEvidence that the SEC is "Captured"by Wall
Street?

Reinforcing both its cultural and process-oriented failings in the
Madoff affair is the likelihood that the SEC has been the victim of
"regulatory capture." It has long been criticized for being too cozy with
the industry it regulates and relying excessively on information provided
by that industry in its enforcement investigation.
The modern American investment market, perversely, does a poor job
of allocating capital to businesses-instead, profits are generated
22. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by
the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-FrankAct, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 127-28 (2012).
23. MADOFF OIG, supranote 1, at 34.
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id. at 30.
26. Id. at 32.
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primarily through the secondary market.27 These profits, however, are
massive. As the regulator of an incredibly wealthy sector, the SEC is
particularly vulnerable to influence by the firms over which it exercises
oversight.
The SEC's cozy relationship with the industry it regulates has been
enhanced, some argue, by the Commission's strong push to receive
cooperation from the targets of its investigation. Through a "darker
lens," this "can imply a quiet agreement between a firm and its
regulator, in which the firm acquires leniency in exchange for assisting
Enforcement staff. ... 28

Moreover, SEC attorneys know that their best employment prospects
after government service include working for the very firms that
represent the targets of governmental investigations: "[T]hese attorneys
know that the legendary knights of so many crusades are now the elites
of the securities enforcement defense bar, which may incline ambitious
SEC lawyers to follow the same path." 29
Critics argue that "the problem" at the SEC is not "simply with the
particular staff members involved in the fiasco," but rather a broader and
more "insidious form of corruption inherent in the SEC's culture,
whereby what happens inside the agency is largely driven by the desire
of top officials to cultivate lucrative job opportunities on Wall Street
when they leave."3 o
III. TEMPLATES
A. The FederalApproach to Intelligence
In addition to considering OMI's creation in light of the SEC's
historical approach to handling tips, it is worthwhile to situate OMI
against the broader background of federal intelligence activities.
Federal intelligence activities have long been bedeviled by expectations
that are too high or too low 3 1 and by a failure to grasp the importance of
educating the public, not just the government's top decision makers,
27. John A. Barrett, Jr., It's Time for a Good Hard Look in the Mirror: The Corporate Law
Example, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 943, 978 (2012).
28. Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
757, 794 (2005).
29. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the
Faceof Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1591, 1622 (2006).
30. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 900; but see generally David Zaring, Against Being Against the
Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507 (2013) (arguing that the explanatory value of the revolving
door indictment is overstated).
31. HENRY A. CRUMPTON, THE ART OF INTELLIGENCE: LESSONS FROM A LIFE IN THE CIA's
CLANDESTINE SERVICE 2 (2012).
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about the role and limits of intelligence activities.32
1. The Intelligence Cycle
The cornerstone of intelligence is the concept of an intelligence cycle:
the "process by which information is acquired, converted into finished
intelligence, and made available to policymakers." 33 Different sources
would list different steps in the cycle, but five are typically identified:
(1) planning and direction, (2) collection, (3) processing, (4) analysis
and production, and (5) dissemination.34 Here, collection means the
"purposeful acquisition of any information that might be desired by an
analyst, consumer, or operator." 35 Analysis "involves the integration of
collected information-that is, raw intelligence from all sources-into
finished intelligence" products. 36 A simpler, four-stage formulation
would involve the generation of intelligence requirements, collection,
analysis, and dissemination.3 7 The feedback mechanism following
dissemination and prior to the adjustment of the next round of
requirements is critical to the success of intelligence and requires regular
"customer assessment of intelligence value."38
The intelligence cycle provides a formal structure and discipline for
intelligence activities.3 9 Without a cyclical and formal approach to
intelligence, there is the danger that intelligence functions can become
"disjointed," representing no more than a "series of discrete events" as
opposed to a "reinforcing cycle between intelligence collector, analyst,
and consumer."40 The cycle provides insurance of an "integrated and
holistic system," with parties responsible for "each stage of the
cycle ... accountable to the others in a non-linear fashion."41 The cycle
makes intelligence a process, rather than an event.42
Figure One depicts visually an example of the intelligence cycle, in
this case from the FBI.

32. Id. at 9.
33.

JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 4 (4th ed. 2010).

34. Id.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id. at 3.
37. ALFRED CUMMING & TODD MASSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33033, INTELLIGENCE
REFORM IMPLEMENTATION AT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR

CONGRESS 16 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgplcrs/inteVRL33033.pdf.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id
40. Id.
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id.
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Figure One: The FBI's Intelligence Cycle 43

Active

Collaborationj

2. The Shift to Bayesian Techniques
Traditionally, federal intelligence activities made "little use of either
machines or formal methods."44 Things have changed. As one former
Soviet intelligence analyst observed, "We're all Bayesians now.'As
Bayesian analysis is a term used to "describe both an inclination and a
process to update subjective probabilities in light of new evidence. 4 6
What does this mean in the setting of intelligence? First, one would
ask the question of interest-for instance, how likely is a terrorist
attack?4 7 Analysts would then identify the many paths that could unfold
to lead to an attack, focusing on "indicators that rank higher in
'uniqueness '-that is, those indicators that could only be explained by
reference to the outcome event 48-and considering the "visibility" of
different indicators, meaning whether particular indicators could be
measured by intelligence capabilities.4 9
The Bayesian approach to an intelligence problem "becomes an
assessment of conditional probabilities"-the baseline assessment of a

43. Dept. of Justice, Intelligence Cycle Graphic, FBI.GOv, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/intelligence/image/intelligence-cycle-graphic/view (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
44. GREGORY TREVERTON, INTELLIGENCE FOR AN AGE OF TERROR 11 (2009).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id at 43.
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group's potential to launch a terrorist attack is tracked with "each
available indicator increas[ing] or diminish[ing] that baseline
assessment."50
3. The Unification of Intelligence and Adaptive Operations
Among the major changes initiated after the horrific attacks of 9/11
were centralization (including the creation of a National Intelligence
Director and steps aimed to reduce overlap and duplication in
intelligence activities) and the creation of a National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC).
These changes continued a pre-9/11 merger of intelligence and
operations. The CIA created its Counterterrorism Center (CTC) in 1986
to serve as a "nexus of intelligence and covert action."52 Operators and
analysts were "merged .. . under the same command," and "work[ed]
together to identify, track, and defeat the terrorist entity."53
The 9/11 Commission recommended enhanced unification of
"intelligence and operational planning." 54 This is part of a broad trend
to integrate intelligence capabilities into operational functions,
recognizing the "symbiotic" relationship between the two.55
B. Market Intelligence in the Business World

A second template for the OMI is the use of market intelligence in
business circles-typically something one hears about from
management consultants. Market intelligence "helps organizations
understand their business environment, compete successfully in it, and
grow as a result."56 A market intelligence unit "collects information
about market players and strategically relevant topics and processes it
into insights that support decision-making."57 It builds on traditional
concepts of "business intelligence" and "competitive intelligence."58

50. Id.

51. Id. at 82-83.
52. CRUMPTON, supra note 31, at 121.

53. Id. at 122.
54. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.108TH CONG., THE 9/11 COMM'N

REP.: EXEC. SUMMARY 20 (2004), available at http://www.9-1 Icommission.gov/report/91 IReport.pdf.
55. Ashley Leonczyk, Peacekeeping and Counterinsurgency: How U.S. Military Doctrine Can
Improve Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 204 MIL. L. REV. 66, 123 (2010).
56. HANS HEDIN ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF MARKET INTELLIGENCE: UNDERSTAND, COMPETE
AND GROW IN GLOBAL MARKETS 9 (2011).
57. Id
58. Business intelligence has sometimes "earned ... a shady reputation" and been "narrowly
perceived as keeping an eye on the competition." Id (internal quotations marks omitted).
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Broadly defined, market intelligence activities were pursued by 76%
of companies in one survey of 989 firms, and of those firms surveyed
without such a function, 1/3 planned to launch one within the next
year. 59 A typical market intelligence unit would consist of thirteen
staffers.o

Market intelligence has a variety of uses for business firms, including
strategic planning, marketing, sales and account management,
innovation and product management, and supply chain management.61
Market intelligence functions can provide early warning by identifying
"weak signals" of business shifts, whereas management might typically
focus only on strong signals.62

The keys to a successful market intelligence activity include a small
number of organizational layers between the market intelligence
function and the firm's CEO, the regular production of "deliverables" by
the MI unit, and centralized and larger MI activities. 63
1. The Market Intelligence Cycle
As in the military and defense settings, the concept of a "cycle"
distinguishes market intelligence from simple competitive espionage.6
One description involved six stages: (1) needs analysis, (2) covering
secondary information sources, (3) primary research, (4) analysis, (5)
delivery, and (6) utilization and feedback.6 5 Among the most important
of these steps is the first-needs analysis. It is wrong-headed to assume
"that the management of a company knows what information the
company will need." 66
Just as military and security intelligence exploits new technologies,
tools, and advanced statistical techniques, market intelligence does the
same. For instance, the content of web sites can be "mined" using
algorithms to generate useful intelligence. 67

59. Id. at 22.
60. Id. at 28.
61. Id. at 20.
62. Id. at 138.
63. Id. at 31-32.
64. Id. at 10 ("Processing business information into actionable insights that help organizations
understand, compete and grow in their market is a cyclical process.").
65. Id. at 63, fig. 5.1.
66. Id. at 66.
67. See, e.g., Danxiang Ai et al., Web Content Mining for Market Intelligence Acquiring from
B2C Websites, 4256 LECTURE NOTEs IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 159 (2006).
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C. Market Intelligence in the SROs
Perhaps the most direct parallel to OMI's new portfolio is FINRA's
"Office of Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence" (OFDMI), formed
as the result of the combination of the NYSE and FINRA insider trading
programs.6 8 OFDMI was created in 200969 "to investigate and refer
potential fraudulent matters, with a focus on insider trading and Ponzi
schemes, to the SEC or federal law enforcement aencies.",70 By the end
of its first year, OFDMI had 130 staff members.W Its three teams-the
Central Review Group, Office of the Whistleblower, and Insider
Trading and Fraud Surveillance-are responsible "for the centralized
intake and evaluation of regulatory filings and investor complaints." 72
In 2010, FINRA's OFDMI referred more than 550 matters to the
SEC,73 including 244 insider trading cases. 74 OFDMI's work is
supported by "specialized computer software," known as the Securities
Observation News Analysis and Regulation or SONAR system.
OFDMI is a "high-tech, specialized unit that uses artificial intelligence
and dozens of analysts to comb through SEC filings, trading records,
press releases and its own database of prior investigations to look for
suspicious trading." 76

68. Press Release, Fin. Ind. Reg. Auth., FINRA 2010 Year in Review, Dec. 17, 2010,
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2010/P122662.
69. Sylvia Scott, Reforms to FINRA's Examination Programare Focused on FraudDetection:
What Does this Mean for Those Who are the Subject of a FINRA Inquiry?, FREEMAN, FREEMAN &
SMILEY

LLP,

at

3,

http://www.ffslaw.com/tasks/sites/ffslaw/assets/image/Reforms%20to%2OFINRAs%20Examination%2
OProgram.pdf.
70. Christopher P. Montagano, Note, The Global Crackdown on Insider Trading: A Silver Lining
to the "GreatRecession ", 19 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 575, 595 (2012).
71. Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization'sPenalties
and the Nature ofSelf-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 976 n.78 (2012).
72. Scott, supra note 69, at 4.
73. Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-goingDebate about SecuritiesSelf-Regulation:
It's Time to End FINRA 's FederalIncome Tax Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REv. 135, 152 n.l 02 (2011).
74. Montagno, supranote 70, at 595.
75. Ben Protess, For Wall Street Watchdog, All Grunt Work, Little Glory, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, Dec. 1, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/for-wall-street-watchdog-all-gruntwork-little-glory/.
76. Joseph D. Edmondson Jr. & Richard Wallace, Responding to FINRA 's Insider Trading
Inquiries, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2012), at 3, http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/76e5852f-ale9-457eb037-dd6Odl840581/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/703de397-8fa4-4d98-8489debcc424a6b2/WallaceEdmondsonLaw360.pdf.
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IV. OMI
A. Mission
OMI's responsibility, according to Enforcement Chief Robert
Khuzami, would be the "analysis, risk-weighing, triage, referral and
monitoring of the extraordinary number of tips, complaints and referrals
that the SEC receives each year." 7 7 OMI would exploit the "information
tapestry"78 available to the SEC. It would be a "different sort of
specialized unit."79
B. Capabilities& Activities of the OMT
1. Role of the OMI
OMI's first role is as the initial entry point for whistleblower tips.
OMI uses a variety of tools to "blend the public complaint information
that formerly came in through our Enforcement Complaint Center with
the complex market data provided by the self-regulatory
organizations." 80 OMI would serve as the principle entity to conduct
"triage and develop tips and leads to get that information to the right
people within the Division [of Enforcement] in real time."81
All tips received by the SEC's Division of Enforcement are now
channeled to OMI, which reviews those complaints and when triage
suggests further investigation is warranted, assigns the complaint to a
Regional Office or specialized unit within the Division of
Enforcement. 82 A complaint that does not merit investigation would be
designated NFA (no further action), though NFAs would be reviewed a
second time and might be referred to "an external government agency or
other agency for action."83 The SEC's Office of the Whistleblower
(OWB) could also trigger expedited triage of a particularly credible tip
77. Robert S. Khuzami, SEC Director of the Division of Enforcement, Remarks at News
Conference Announcing Enforcement Cooperationand New Senior Leaders, Jan. 13, 2010, available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0l1310rsk.htm.
78. Thomas A. Sporkin, SEC Chief of the Office of Market Intelligence, Remarks at News
Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division, Jan. 13, 2010, available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310newsconf.htm#sporkin.
79. Khuzami, supra note 77.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EVALUATION OF THE SEC's WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM,
Rept.
No.
511,
Jan.
18,
2013,
at
2,
http://www.secoig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2013/511 .pdf [hereinafter SEC OIG, WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT].
83. Id.
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at the OMI level.84
2. OMI's Technology
In addition to its triage and referral role, OMI would "proactively
identify market practices and activities that pose risks to investors and
assess how to best address those practices and activities."" OMI
generates a daily intelligence report distributed within the SEC.8 6
Technologically, OMI's activities would be facilitated through the
construction of a "state-of-the-art data collection, surveillance, and
analytics room. ,,87 The room includes Bloomberg terminals and realtime stock pricing monitors.88 All of the "plumbing" was brought into
one place. 89
OMI's new systems would come to replace the previous SEC
"Enforcement Complaint Center," which has been described as a "fancy
name for an e-mail box at the SEC where the public could send tips."90
This existing e-mail box would be retired in favor of a web-based form
that tipsters could fill out on-line, with data feeding into systems
allowing OMI to "audit the workflow on an ongoing basis" and
"generate red flags if matters deemed significant later 'die on the
vine."' 91 Importantly, the database would be accessible to all 2,300 SEC
employees, who could access tips and obtain updates on the progress of
investigations launched in response. 92 The new system cost the SEC
some $21 million.9 3
The new system for receiving complaints is certainly an
84. Id.
85. Sporkin, supranote 78.
86. Ben Protess & Azam Ahmed, With New Firepower,SEC Tracks Bigger Game, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, May 21, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/with-new-firepower-s-e-c-tracksbigger-game/.
87. Sporkin, supranote 78. An image of the new workspace, during development, is available at
SEC Seeks Better Muni Disclosure, Record Keeping, REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2012,
http://www.reuters.comI/article/2012/03/19/us-municipals-regulation-sec-idUSBRE82IOYV20120319.
88. Bruce Carton, Whistleblower and Other Tips Pouring in to OAI1, the SEC's 'Central
23,
2012,
COMPLIANCE
WEEK,
May
Intelligence
Office',
http://www.complianceweek.com/whistleblower-and-other-tips-pouring-in-to-omi-the-secs-centralintelligence-office/article/242528/.
89. Sarah N. Lynch & Matthew Goldstein, Whistleblower Reforms Pay Dividendsfor SEC; Tips
database,Partnershipwith FBI PrepareAgency for the Next Bernie MadoffScheme, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
July 28, 2011, 2011 WLNR 14887669.
90. Bruce Carton, Details Emerge on SEC Office of Market Intelligence, SECURITIES DOCKET,
Feb. 9, 2010, http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/02/09/details-emerge-on-sec-office-of-marketintelligence/.
9 1. Id
92. Lynch & Goldstein, supra note 89.
93. Id.
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improvement. The SEC's former "Complaint Center," depicted in
Figure Two, contained a link to an e-mail address,
enforcement@sec.gov, which was immediately followed by the
admonishment, "Please do not use this email box for general comments
or questions." If the goal of a site is to recruit tipsters, this somewhat
unwelcoming tone runs contrary to that objective. The improved
version,9 4 in Figure Three, is a much more modem system. After
logging in, a tipster checks various boxes and provides free-form
responses to various questions. Importantly, this helps channel a tip into
a useable format. Whistleblowers, left only with an e-mail address to
contact, may often do themselves a disservice by failing to provide
sufficient detail or by selecting e-mail "handles" that undermine their
standing in the eyes of SEC attorneys-like one whistleblower, who
used the e-mail address bountyman@aol.com and described the subject
of his email "Application for Award of Bounty" (at a time when
bounties were not available in his case).s The new system also allows
the tipster to upload supporting documentation to their complaint.
Figure Two: Old SEC "Complaint Center" 96

SEC Center for Complaints and Enforcement
Tips- Report a potential violation of the securities laws directly to enforcemnentrise,qov_.
Please do not use this email box for general comments or questions.
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to fde yourcomplast electrontky.

ips Reporta pot a violation of the scubes la.s d *ectly
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Please
donot use tsemailboofor goneral
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Span. - For-anlinimst-ot-relati W., e-as

to orCO'tfrtO

t.

Sat.

i.

Questions - Useour"tt
"Answn
web pagoforgeticrol
question aboutthefoderal
securities lawsor yor investments.

94. SEC,
Tips,
Complaints
and
Referrals
Portal,
https://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/disclaimer.xhtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
95. Rapp, supra note 22, at 127.
96. Kappies, Comment to Free Speech Ladies and Gentleman UNTIL?, INVESTOR VILLAGE
(Nov.
15,
2007,
3:16:49
PM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20090221004759/http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml(on file with author).
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Figure Three: Updated TCR Portal

3. Staffing
OMI staff initially consisted of around thirty9 7 personnel-the results
of cannibalizing the staff of the Office of Market Surveillance and the
Office of Internet Enforcement." It would grow to include forty former
traders, exchange experts, accountants, and lawyers, 99 and eventually,
apparently, to a staff of sixty-five.' 0 0 Public documents reveal that the
Office's staff included a Bank Secrecy Act specialist,10 1 a dedicated
FCPA liaison' 02 to the FCPA unit, 10 3 and an embedded FBI Supervisory
Special Agent.104
97. Carton, supranote 88.
98. Id.
99. Protess & Ahmed, supra note 86.
100. Lori Walsh, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/lori-walsh/a/26b/218?trk-pub-pbmap
(last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
101. Agenda for the Roundtable on the Execution, Clearance and Settlement of Microcap
Securities, Oct. 17, 2011,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/microcap/microcaproundtable101711agenda.htm.
102. Jennifer Carr, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/jennifer-carr/39/101/924 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2014).
103. The SEC created its Foreign Corrupt Practices Unit in 2010 as part of a "big" and "bold"
effort to enforce anticorruption laws in the financial setting. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Role of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Transnational Anti-Corruption Laws in Preventing or
Lessening Future Financial Crises, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1283, 1316 (2012).
104. Dep't of Justice, Financial Crimes Report to the Public, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
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The Office added five FTE positions in 2011 to "strengthen" its
"intelligence analysis function," including its role in "risk assessment"
and "strategic planning" to maximize the Commission's "strategic,
swift, smart and successful" investigations.' 0 5 Twenty-eight staff
members were added in the 2012 Fiscal Year budget request.106 The
Commission's FY2014 budget request sought twenty-six new positions
to "strengthen the intelligence analysis function," including staffing
TCR points-of-contact in the SEC's eleven regional offices. 107
These technological responses and increased staffing are essential in
light of the rapid increase in tips expected in the aftermath of the
adoption of bounty rewards in the Dodd-Frank Act. Bounties have
caused a spike in tips from twenty a day, to more than 200 a day, and
OMI itself has generated seven quality tips a day.' 08
4. Future Plans
Initial technology would be supplemented as time progressed through
the support of MITRE, 09 a quasi-governmental advanced technology
operation."10 MITRE is assisting the SEC in developing its OMI
technological platforms, and is planning an "artificial intelligence
upgrade to help connect tips and complaints that might not appear
related.""' These systems will support the use of statistics to "trace
connections" between tips,"l 2 syncing with the intelligence community's
increased interest in Bayesian techniques.
While the exact details of MITRE's contribution remain undisclosed,
some hint is provided by the research projects in the area conducted by
MITRE. For instance, it published a study entitled Evidence-Based
services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-201 1. The first agent assigned to OMI, Jeffrey
Homer, is an "accountant who worked for audit giant PriceWaterhouseCoopers before joining the [FBI]
in 2004." Lynch & Goldstein, supra note 89.
105. SEC, In Brief FY 2011 Congressional Justification, SEC at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfylIcongbudgjust.pdf.
106. SEC, In Brief FY 2012 Congressional Justification, SEC at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfyl2congbudgjust.pdf.
107. SEC, FY 2014 Budget Request by Program, SEC (2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/sec-fy2014-budget-request-by-program.pdf
108. Carton, supranote 88.
109. Carton, supranote 90.
110. MITRE is an "entirely independent, self-funding, and expert consult[ant] on government
decisions affecting the public interest. . . " Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial
Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 537, 564 (2012). It was spun off from MIT's Lincoln Laboratory
in 1958 and performs "research on national defense issues," with a steadily expanded "scope of
activities." Lawrence G. Baxter, "Capture" in FinancialRegulation: Can We Channel it Toward the
Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 199 (2011).

111. Carton, supra note 90.
112. Protess & Ahmed, supranote 86.
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Analysis for Financial Data which aimed to "conduct time series

analyses of known transactions of interest to law enforcement personnel,
regulators, and intelligence analysts in order to identify non-accounting
evidence that can be correlated with those transactions."" 3 By "nonaccounting evidence" MITRE means "corporate filings, public
statements, and press coverage from 24 months prior to the transaction
to 36 months after.""14
The study would seek to identify
"indicators .. . that correlate to offenses" and use "data visualization
tools and other techniques" to facilitate use of that intelligence in
enforcement activities."'
MITRE's contribution suggests that OMI is embracing the Bayesian
approach pursued by federal intelligence activities in the defense and
security contexts. The Bayesian intelligence approach in the financial
fraud context would look at the timing of various activities and focus
both on unique indicators (those that are only associated with financial
fraud) and on visible indicators (those that can be measured). This
approach will likely draw on recent research suggesting that a variety of
data mining techniques-such as "logistic models, neural networks, the
Bayesian belief network, [and] decision trees"-can provide effective
tools for fraud detection.1 16
D. Leadership

The Office's first leader, Thomas Sporkin, was a "rising star"' 1 7 and
the son of "perhaps the most famous SEC enforcement director,"
Stanley Sporkin.1 ' 8 The Washington Post quoted one securities lawyer
as observing, the "Sporkin family is to SEC enforcement what the
Manning family is to NFL football."" 9

113. CHARLES WORRELL, EVIDENCE-BASED ANALYSIS FOR FINANCIAL DATA (2009), available

at
https://web.archive.org/web/20101217233806/http://mitre.org/news/events/exchangeO9/1909MI44.pdf.
114. WORRELL, supra note 113, at4.
115. Id.
116. E.W.T. Ngai et al., The Application of Data Mining Techniques in Financial Fraud
Detection: A Classification Framework and an Academic Review of the Literature, 50 DECISION
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 559 (2010). See also S. Kotsiantis, ForecastingFraudulent FinancialStatements
Using DataMining, 3 INT'L J. OF COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 104 (2006); Efstathios Kirkos et al.,
Data Mining Techniques for the Detection of Fraudulent FinancialStatements, 32 EXPERT SYSTEMS
WITH APPLICATIONS 995 (2007); K. Baumgartner et al., Constructing Bayesian Networks for Criminal
ProfilingFrom Limited Data,XXX KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS (2008).
117. Protess & Ahmed, supra note 86.
118. Zachary A. Goldfarb, At SEC Enforcement Unit, Storied Chiefs Son Makes a Name for
Himself THE WASHINGTON POST, July 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/05/AR2010070502544.html.
119. Id.
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An intelligence activity should be led by someone with strong
communication skills and the ability to "lead up" the chain of command.
Intelligence activities should be directed not just by someone with the
usual leadership skills, but also a persuasive style that can market the
intelligence function "both towards top executives and to interest groups
across the organization."' 20 Leadership itself is more important than
hands-on experience in the day-to-day intelligence work.
Sporkin's experience as the SEC's Deputy Chief of the Office of
Internet Enforcement 121 was particularly relevant given OMI's emphasis
on exploiting advanced technological tools to conduct its oversight
activities.
In 2013, Vincente Martinez took over the leadership of OMI.122 A
former SEC Staff Attorney and Senior Counsel, he had left the SEC to
become director of the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission
whistleblower office.
IV. PROGNOSIS AND INITIAL SUCCESSES

A. Reasonsfor Caution

OMI's launch has not been without hiccups. An Inspector General
Report in January 2013 criticized the office for lacking a "written
policy" to cover the number of days a tip remained in "manual
triage." 23 Although OMI's responses were found to be timely, the
Office lacked a standard "for determin[ing] whether the response is
prompt or not." 24 Most critically, the IG found that OMI had "not
established any performance metrics." 25 The IG expressed concern that
the absence of performance metrics could impede performance and lead
to "unnecessarily long response times." 2 6
In the time since, OMI has addressed these concerns. Two more
significant-and related-questions surround any effort to predict the
efficacy of OMI in the coming years.
First, intelligence activities in the national security and business sense
have both embraced the notion of a cycle, in which finished products
help feed into the identification of new intelligence priorities, the
120. HEDIN ET AL., supra note 56, at 102.
121. Carton, supra note 90.
122. Press Release, SEC, Vincente Martinez Named Chief of the SEC's Office of Market
Intelligence (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-8.htm.
123. SEC OIG, WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 82, at 17.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 20.
126. Id. at 17.
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allocation of collection resources, and future intelligence activities.
OMI was stood up in response to past failings but perhaps with less than
clear direction on what the SEC's intelligence priorities were or should
be. The initial fanfare paid to OMI concentrated on its tools, rather than
its missions. One wonders whether intelligence requirements, as
opposed to technological capabilities, are driving the development of
the Office. As other federal agencies have developed intelligence
functions, such as the FBI after 9/11, those agencies have also struggled
to overcome "structural and cultural" obstacles to the development of an
integrated intelligence cycle.127 At the SEC, there are no doubt similar
obstacles, but the larger area of concern is that OMI has not yet
articulated a self-identity based on the feedback cycle essential to
effective intelligence.128
What would a meaningful intelligence cycle look like for OMI? First,
some entity or actor within the SEC must be given tasking authoritythe institutional power to formulate intelligence priorities.129 While
OMI appears to have inferred its priorities from past SEC failures and
current enforcement activities, focusing, as discussed in the next Part, on
high-concern areas like insider trading and microcap fraud, it is not yet
clear where the Office's tasking authority resides. Alternatively, to the
extent that OMI has been structured primarily as a processing activity
for tips, the danger is that it will lack focus-concentrating only on
reactive processing rather than engaging in disciplined requirementsdriven analysis that marshals all available information to generate
actionable intelligence deliverables.
To some extent, OMI operates in an environment for which the most
apt exemplar is not military intelligence or the all-source activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency, but rather the National Security Agency,
responsible for analysis related to the intercept of communications or
"signals intelligence."' 30 The NSA deals with an "enormous" "flow of
data," and the "key to success" is the careful "tailor[ing]" of its activities
according to "targetin priorities" identified by its intelligence
community customers.1X Similarly, the volume of data surrounding
127. CUMMING & MASSEY, supra note 37, at 27.
128. It is possible such a concept has been generated internally, but the author was unable to find
any public reference to a cycle of analysis applicable to the OMI, including in the SEC's various
statements
on
the
Office,
the
Commission's
strategic
plan,
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplanl015.pdf, and its Enforcement Manual.
SEC Div. of
Enforcement,
Enforcement
Manual
(2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf. A search of SEC documents available on
the Commission's web site for "intelligence cycle" generated no hits.
129. CUMMINGS & MASSEY, supra note 37, at 39.
130. Exec. Order 12333, 46 FED REG. 59941 (Dec. 12,1981).
131. John Cary Sims, What NSA is Doing... and Why It's Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
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financial market activity under the SEC's authority is massive.132
Without a mission tailored around enforcement "targeting priorities,"
OMI's effectiveness will be undercut.
On a related note, the decision to carve an intelligence apparatus out
of the Division of Enforcement creates a potential danger that
intelligence will become disconnected from the enforcement operational
activities it is meant to serve. In the national security setting, recent
changes have shifted intelligence into operational activities, rather than
carving it out. Will OMI be evaluated based on how well it generates
products which appear to reflect "intelligence analysis"? Or, as would
be proper, on the degree to which its activities facilitate enforcement
success? While the full staffing of OMI is not publically available, the
fact that OMI contains liaisons to various other units (and that regional
offices will be hiring or appointing liaisons to OMI) may mitigate this
concern.

These regional liaisons may help to ensure that OMI's

products remain connected to the SEC's operational-level enforcement
activities.
Moving forward, OMI's strategic direction, first and foremost, should
embrace the notion of an intelligence cycle and that cycle should specify
the various entities responsible for each step in the intelligence process.
Figure Four represents a suggested vision for OMI. Metrics are
essential-but OMI should go beyond metrics surrounding how quickly
it processes information and develop metrics based on the impact of its
intelligence activities.

105, 117 (2006).
132. Forecasting financial risks involves churning through "massive" amounts of financial data.
Erik F. Gerding, The Dangers ofDelegating FinancialRegulation to Risk Models, 29 No. 4 BANKING &
FIN. SERV. POL'Y REP. 1, 1 (2010).
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Figure Four: Suggested OMI Intelligence Cycle
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OMI should also consider adding to its activities techniques and tools
employed by other intelligence analytical operations.1 33 For instance,
OMI could create a "red cell." A team could be assigned to "think
unconventionally about the full range of relevant analytical issues,"
taking an "'out-of-the-box' approach" and producing deliverables
"intended to provoke thought rather than to provide authoritative
assessment."l34 Imagine, as an example, a red team assigned to
133. The Director of National Intelligence was required by law to "establish a process and assign
an individual or entity the responsibility for ensuring that, as appropriate, elements of the intelligence
community conduct alternative analysis (commonly referred to as 'red team analysis') of the
information and conclusions in intelligence products." Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, § 1017 (2004). For a useful discussion of red team analysis, see Mark
Mateski,
Red
Teaming: A
Short Introduction, REDTEAMJOURNAL.COM
(June
2009),
http://redteamjournal.com/papers/A%20Short%20Introduction%20to%20Red%20Teaming/20(ldotO).
pdf.
134. History, CIA (last visited Feb. 8, 2014), https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-
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conceive and design a Ponzi scheme or an insider trading arrangement
designed to avoid detection.
B. Success Stories
Initial stories have emerged describing some of OMI's successes.
OMI participated in an insider trading probe netting a trader named
Garrett Bauer and his tipster, attorney Matthew Kluger, who had worked
at New York law firms including Cravath, Swaine and Moore, LLP, and
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, LLP, but ceased providing
tips at some point out of a fear of detection.135 The scheme resumed
after Kluger moved to the Washington, D.C. office of the Silicon Valley
firm Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich and Rosati, LLP. Between 2006 and
2011, the two men invested $109 million and made over $32 million in
profits, avoiding detection through a variety of techniques including the
use of pay phones and throwaway cellular telephones.' 3 6 OMI examined
the trades of Mr. Bauer and identified a correlation with mergers on
which Kluger's firm, Wilson Sonsini, had provided counsel.1 37
A second publicized success story involved OMI's use of "enhanced
techniques" to scrutinize microcap stocks and identify dormant shell
companies employed as part of pump-and-dump schemes.138 This led to
a trading suspension order affecting 379 companies, the largest such
order in SEC history.
The details of OMI's contributions to these investigations are not
available, but the fact that the Office has been credited in some of the
more high profile enforcement actions of the last two years is a positive
sign.
C. A New Hope?
These success stories may hint to the potential positive effects of the
OMI. At least two important positive consequences may flow from the
new Office's activities.
First, the Office may help to break the traditional culture of resistance
analysis/history.html.
135. Protess & Ahmed, supra note 86; Porter Wright, New York Times Reports on SEC Database
and Other Tactics Used to Help Detect Insider Trading, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW BLOG (May 23,
2012),
http://www.fedseclaw.com/2012/05/articles/insider-trading-1/new-york-times-reports-on-secdatabase-and-udLer-tactics-used-to-help-detect-insider-trading/#axzz2LNjLP6f8.
136. id.
137. Id.
138. Press Release, SEC, SEC Microcap Fraud-FightingInitiative Expels 379 Dormant Shell
Companies to Protect Investors from Potential Scams (May 14, 2012), available at
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressReleasell365171489086#.UvaKoEJdXM.
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OMI (and the related Office of the
to outside information.
Whistleblower) staffers will be evaluated on how effectively they handle
outside tips, at least in part. It is entirely understandable that, in the
past, an SEC enforcement attorney would choose to pursue a "high
value" tip generated by a respected SRO, rather than a tip received from
a whistleblower with possibly questionable motives. Given resource
limitations, an SRO tip would strike an attorney as much more of a sure
thing. OMI, however, will be judged not just according to how it
responds to the obviously valuable tip, but based on how it responds to
tips from less traditional sources. This should provide hope that the
SEC of the future will do a better job in identifying fraud in spite of tips
coming in from unusual (and sometimes difficult) individual
whistleblowers.
Second, the Office may help to build a new willingness on the part of
the SEC to think about its regulatory portfolio along a longer time
horizon. Donald Langevoort has suggested that the SEC may, due to
resource limitations, have preferred to "fight the fires surrounding it"
rather than "invest in a deeper knowledge base with, at best, long-term
payoffs." 39 He fears that the SEC's "internal culture" includes a
"disinclination to know too much in ways that would destabilize beliefs
that are adaptive in maintaining organizational coherence." 40
The very absence of an "intelligence cycle" driving OMI's mission
may mean that OMI pursues open-ended questions that present
unexpected answers which can help shape the future activities of the
SEC. The SEC's operations in the past have arguably been guided by
simplistic performance metrics, such as the "need to have year-by-year
increases in the number of cases opened, brought and settled," which
leads the Commission to avoid "the daunting and the costly."'41 As a
result of the stand-up of OMI, we may come to see "far greater financial
sophistication" introduced to the "agency's thinking and training." 42
V. CONCLUSION
How significant a shift OMI represents in the SEC's internal
organization remains open to question. Time will tell whether the
creation of OMI and other new offices helps improve the SEC's
actual-and perceived-effectiveness.

139.
140.
141.
142.

Langevoort, supra note 29, at 1615.
Id.
Langevoort, supra note 2, at 906.
Id. at 910.
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